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The Controlled Substance Act (“CSA”) of 1970 serves as a near midpoint 
for considering a century of drug regulation, dating to the Harrison 
Narcotic Tax Act (1914), the now-quaint first federal step in this field, i.e. 
of taxing the sale of (but not outright criminalizing) cocaine and opium. 
The early cases construing the Harrison Act are similarly anachronistic. 
Bundled as “public welfare cases” and including United States v. Balint,1 
in those early days, the Supreme Court was willing to forego requiring the 
element of “criminal intent” to be read into general and novel statutes like 
the Harrison Narcotic Tax Act, and in Balint yielded to apparent 
congressional wisdom to punish controlled substance violations without 
an impediment of traditional mens rea.  
This logic would seem to have been explicitly “firewalled” to its bygone 
era by Morissette v. United States (1952),2 particularly in light of the 
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1    United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922) (an 886-word, conclusory opinion of Chief 
Justice Taft, often referenced as one of “the public welfare cases,” in conjunction with Shevlin-
Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57 (1910) and/or United States v. Behrmann, 258 U.S. 280 
(1910)).  
2    Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) (explaining the narrow limits of the logic 
of the public welfare cases and approving them only the circumstances in which they were made).  
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modern, comprehensive CSA subsequently “clearing the field” in 1970. 
Convicted immigrants only wish they were so lucky.  
In a parallel track, use of the “categorical approach” in modern criminal3 
and immigration4 law has evolved to require strict comparison of federal 
and state definitions of criminal offenses in order for those offenses to 
trigger sentencing or deportation consequences. This implies that both 
state drug offenses and drug definitions also require a literal federal 
analogue, under the CSA, to prompt collateral federal treatment. Again, 
convicted immigrants only wish it were so simple.  
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), part of the U.S. Department of 
Justice, has repeatedly invoked the “public welfare cases” to justify 
removal of immigrants for drug offenses in the absence of proof of their 
criminal intent.5 In 2019, the BIA had further telegraphed reluctance to 
requiring strict uniformity in state drug definitions vis-à-vis the federal 
enumerated standard substance before permitting an immigration 
consequence to flow from a related offense.6  
The author has written on, and litigated—both successfully7 and 
unsuccessfully,8 and in pending matters9—these issues as both primary 
counsel and for amici curiae. This article develops the interconnectedness 
of the above two topics, in order to comprehensively discuss the 
immigration consequences of drug convictions, particularly as evolved 
since 1996 and to attempt to reconcile 1) tracks of Supreme Court civil 
 
3    See, e.g., Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013); Mathis v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 
2243 (2016).  
4    See, e.g., Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47 (2006); Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013); 
Mellouli v. Lynch,  575 U.S. 798 (2015); Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S.Ct. 1562 (2017).  
5    See, e.g., Matter of Esqueda, 20 I. & N. Dec. 850 (BIA 1994) (possessory context); Matter 
of L-G-H-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 365 (BIA 2014) (aggravated felony context).  
6    See Matter of Navarro-Guadarrama, 27 I. & N. Dec. 560 (BIA 2019) (acknowledging the 
dissonance between the Florida and federal definitions of cannabis, in that Florida criminalizes all parts 
of the cannabis plant, but still finding a Florida conviction triggered an immigration consequence 
because the immigrant had failed to meet their burden of proof to establish that Florida actually 
prosecutes offenders in incidents that relate only to parts of the plant (such as stalks) that could not be 
the basis of a federal prosecution).  
7    Donawa v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 735 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding that a state scheme 
missing a mens rea requirement cannot trigger immigration treatment as a “drug trafficking crime” 
“aggravated felony,” because without a mens rea element it is not the equivalent of any federal offense).  
8    Choizilme v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 886 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir. 2018) (giving deference to an 
agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statutory term and holding that a state scheme missing a mens 
rea requirement can trigger immigration treatment as a “illicit trafficking” “aggravated felony,” 
because “illicit trafficking” has no generic definition).  
9    See, e.g., BIA Amicus Invitation 18-02-28.  
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and criminal jurisprudence regarding mens rea and 2) the collision course 
of the “categorical approach” with the interpretive principles of 
Chevron.10 In doing so, the article makes recommendations for a more 
consistently principled, predictable, and uniform intersection of the CSA 
and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).  
While this paper mostly deals with highly technical explanations of legal 
theories11 in the criminal-immigration universe, it should not be lost on 
the reader just how out of touch the legalese gets from reality. In a way, it 
is a microcosm of the larger social problem. America’s cultural duality is 
on display—with our aspirational decadence conflicting with our 
puritanical roots—and we struggle to balance these extreme polarities. If 
controlled substances were regulated from a holistic public health 
perspective, if our laws were not so dissonant with our culture’s appetites, 
or even if drugs were taxed (not outright banned) as in 1914, we could 
avoid much of the technical jousting of the following pages. However, as 
it is, we have serious legal “apex” scenarios—criminal sentence 
enhancements and deportation—in which society’s wrath bares down on 
individuals, typically with consequences disproportionate to the “harm” 
(if any) they inflicted upon society. With the stakes so raised, the esoteric 
legal analysis is the necessary antidote and justified defensive tool to a 




We have all been bombarded by recent political rhetoric, labeling immigrants 
as “rapists and murderers,”12 the undocumented as likely to drive while intoxicated,13 
and DACA recipients (aka “DREAMers”) as “hardened criminals.”14 This is 
counter-factual, of course, as empirical data shows that the immigrant population 
 
10   Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  
11   As such, and in the interest of focus and brevity, the reader will notice that this is purposefully 
an exploration of primary materials—cases—and the theories contained therein, not of academic 
commentary upon those cases.  
12   See, e.g., Katie Reilly, Here Are All the Times Donald Trump Insulted Mexico, TIME (Aug. 
31, 2016), https://time.com/4473972/donald-trump-&/ (“‘They are not our friend, believe me,’ he said, 
before disparaging Mexican immigrants: ‘They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re 
rapists. And some, I assume, are good people.’”).  
13   Alex Nowrasteh & Andrew C. Forrester, Do Illegal Immigrants Increase Drunk Driving 
Deaths?, CATO INSTITUTE (Oct. 18, 2019), https://www.cato.org/blog/do-illegal-immigrants-increase-
drunk-driving-deaths (summarizing media and political rhetoric assigning disproportionate 
responsibility to undocumented immigrants).  
14   Aaron Rupar, Trump’s Attempt to Smear DACA Recipients as “Hardened Criminals” is 
Untethered From Reality, VOX (Nov. 12, 2019), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/ 
11/12/20961139/trump-daca-tweet-hardened-criminals-scotus.  
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commits criminal offenses at a rate below that of the native born,15 that there is no 
statistical correlation between the undocumented population and DUI offenses,16 
and by definition not only do DACA recipients have to be nearly crime-free,17 but 
their loss of status based on criminality is nearly non-existent, at a mere 0.3 percent 
over five years.18  
Nonetheless, this labeling and fearmongering pervades the national dialogue 
and dictates some policy outcomes. Under every executive, but particularly under 
the Trump administration, the Department of Justice and its administrative court 
system—the Executive Office for Immigration Review and its component 
immigration courts and BIA—continue a one-way ratcheting of interpretations of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) that consistently increase the challenges 
for immigrants to escape deportability for any criminal activity.19 The Justice 
Department has invented new schemes for penalizing DUI in the contexts of bond 
hearing20 and applications for discretionary relief;21 expanded the contexts for theft-
 
15   Robert Farley, Is Illegal Immigration Linked to More or Less Crime, FACTCHECK.ORG (June 
27, 2018), https://www.factcheck.org/2018/06/is-illegal-immigration-linked-to-more-or-less-crime/ 
(“[T]here aren’t readily available nationwide crime statistics broken down by immigration status. But 
the available research that estimates the relationship between illegal immigration and crime generally 
shows an association with lower crime rates.”).  
16   Nowrasteh & Forrester, supra note 13 (“We find no statistical evidence to suggest that places 
with more illegal immigrants are more at risk for drunk driving deaths . . . . Although our regressions 
results are correlative and not causal in nature, they suggest that illegal immigrants do not affect overall 
drunk driving deaths.”).  
17   See Janet Napolitano, Secretary of Homeland Security, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion 
with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children, June 15, 2012, 
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-
us-as-children.pdf (barring such discretion in the case of otherwise qualifying individuals with one 
felony or three or more misdemeanor convictions).  
18   Miriam Valverde, Donald Trump Says Some DACA Recipients are ‘Very Tough, Hardened 
Criminals.’ That’s False, POLITIFACT (Nov. 14, 2019), https://www.politifact.com/ 
factchecks/2019/nov/14/donald-trump/donald-trumps-label-some-daca-recipients-very-toug/) 
(“660,880 people (on average in their mid 20s) were protected from deportation under the program. 
Immigrants are ineligible for the program if they have been convicted of a felony, a significant 
misdemeanor, or three or more misdemeanor offenses . . . . We found that in a five-year period, 
officials ended about 2,130 DACA protections. The majority of the terminations were for arrests or 
convictions unrelated to gang activity; fewer than 70 terminations were related to gang membership or 
affiliation, and they did not involve convictions or arrests . . . . The top three offenses for those arrests 
were driving-related (excluding DUI), immigration-related (such as visa overstays), and ‘theft, larceny, 
etc.’”).  
19   Others have written on this issue in a variety of contexts, but for this author’s overview, see, 
e.g., Michael Vastine, An Immigration Lawyer Walked into a Barr: The Impact of Trump’s Justice 
Department on the Defense of Criminal Immigrants, 25 BARRY L. REV. 57 (2020).  
20   See Matter of Siniaukas, 27 I. & N. Dec. 207 (BIA 2018) (finding that DUI offense creates 
presumption of dangerousness, negating most applicants’ eligibility for bond).  
21   See Castillo-Perez, 27 I. & N. Dec. 664, 670 (AG 2019) (“Multiple DUI convictions represent 
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related and prostitution offenses22 to trigger immigration treatment; and eliminated 
or severely truncated the bases for giving full faith and credit to state criminal court 
judgements that vacate,23 modify or clarify convictions,24 revise sentencing, or 
reinstate late filed appeals.25  
A closer look shows that these outcomes are based on both supposed Chevron 
step one decisions, with the administrative agency determining congressional 
purpose, via its words, to have negative results for immigrants, and in Chevron step 
two, where the agency claims license to freely interpret the statute based on its 
assertion that Congress intended as much, and thus for courts to subsequently defer 
to any “reasonable” interpretation in this scheme. Of course, this is no Maginot Line 
between the application of the two techniques under Chevron, rather an opaque and 
highly contested division, a turf battle between the agency and the federal courts.26 
The agency offers its preferred reading of a statute under Chevron step one, which 
the federal courts then must reassess under a non-deferential de novo standard.27 The 
agency also offers its interpretations under step two, and as those interpretations 
must typically receive judicial deference, litigation in the courts of appeals turns on 
whether the statute had really been subject to agency interpretation in the first place, 
or whether congressional intent could have been gleaned through well-established 
canons of statutory interpretation. At stake are fundamental questions of separation 
of powers, particularly the overreach of the executive branch to bend the words of 
Congress without check by the judiciary.28  
 
a repeated failure to meet the community’s moral standards, rather than a ‘single lapse’ that would be 
less probative of moral character.”). Thus under A.G. Barr, virtually all DUI convictions bar a showing 
of “good moral character” required for long-term undocumented persons to qualify for the discretionary 
relief of cancellation of removal, pursuant to INA § 240A(b). Ironically, while a blight on modern life, 
DUI has no moral element; in fact, DUI offenses typically lack a culpable mens rea at all.  
22   Matter of Ding, 27 I. & N. Dec. 295 (BIA 2018) (departing from Gonzalez-Zoquiapan, 24 I. 
& N. Dec. 549, 553 (BIA 2008), to redefine the term “prostitution” for purposes of deportability, 
expanding it to included conduct other than intercourse, even where this creates dissonant definitions 
of the term “prostitution” within the INA).  
23   See Matter of Marquez-Conde, 27 I. & N. Dec. 251 (BIA 2018).  
24   See Thomas and Thompson, 27 I. & N. Dec. 674 (A.G. 2019).  
25   J.M. Acosta, 27 I. & N. Dec. 420 (BIA 2018).  
26   See, e.g., Baez-Sanchez v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1033 (7th Cir. 2020) (expressing incredulity and 
threatening disciplinary consequences for members of the BIA who repeated failed to implement the 
decision of the Seventh Circuit, made at Chevron step one (via a reading of the parameters of the “U-
visa” statute), where the BIA maintained that it was entitled to deference in an exercise of Chevron 
step two interpretive authority, notwithstanding the Circuit’s order: “In sum, the Board flatly refused 
to implement our decision . . . . We have never before encountered defiance of a remand order, and we 
hope never to see it again. Members of the Board must count themselves lucky that Baez-Sanchez has 
not asked us to hold them in contempt, with all the consequences that possibility entails.”).  
27   See INA § 242(b)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4).  
28   See, e.g., Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1153 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, 
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If any lessons have been learned from the first three years of the Trump 
administration, it is that it will be immodest in its assertion of its claim to power, 
relative to the coequal branches of government. It has been unambiguous since the 
start that it would rule on issues without deference to historic agency norms and read 
(or re-read) the Immigration and Nationality Act and its own regulations through a 
restrictionist lens. It has also been crystal clear since 2016, even before taking office, 
that the administration’s immigration team would be ambitious in the breadth and 
depth of its reimagination of the immigration world, and it has made one substantive 
change to immigration policy every workday that Trump has been in office.29  
It is against this backdrop of political agenda, administrative law norms, and 
constitutional structure that this article will address the contemporary treatment of 
the immigration consequences of drug offenses. Being as the article was first 
presented, and is now subsequently compiled, with a broad array of thoughtful 
articles, essays, and speeches that all address a conference theme of The Controlled 
Substance Act at 50 Years, I will try to “stay in my lane” and out of others’ areas of 
writing and expertise.  
 
II. IMMIGRATION 101: DRUG OFFENSES AND INTERFACE WITH INADMISSIBILITY, 
DEPORTABILITY, AND RELIEF FROM REMOVAL 
 
Readers  outside the immigration practice area may underappreciate the scope 
of immigration problems triggered by violations of controlled substance-related 
statutes. Everything causes trouble. Non-citizens seeking to enter the United States, 
either temporarily or permanently, are “inadmissible” (a term of art) based on any 
controlled substance offense.30 Disqualifying convictions can be via guilty pleas or 
findings of guilt (by judge or jury), which are easily discovered through mandatory 
criminal background checks during the application process. “Convictions” under the 
INA also include the less severe criminal outcomes of “withheld adjudications,”31 a 
 
concurring) (calling for a more assertive role for courts to provide oversight, rather than recurring 
deference to politically motivated executive with changing views, depending on electoral outcomes).  
29   Immigration Policy Tracking Project, https://immpolicytracking.org (last visited Apr. 5, 
2020) (reporting 800 announced new immigration policies, not including those reported changes that 
were not formally announced) (click “Enter Tracking Project” and enter information to request access).  
30   INA § 212(a)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A), Conviction of certain crimes 
(i) In general 
Except as provided in clause (ii), any alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, 
or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of- 
[…] 
(II) a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, 
the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance (as defined in 
section 802 of title 21). 
31   8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) The term “conviction” means, with respect to an alien, a formal 
judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication of guilt has been withheld, where- 
(i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of guilty or nolo 
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common tool utilized in the criminal courts for mitigating the impact of first or 
(typically) minor offenses.  
Drug violations do not necessarily require a conviction at all in order to 
metastasize into an immigration problem, as inadmissibility can also be triggered by 
an admission of the underlying misconduct. These “admissions” can be in a criminal 
court diversionary context, such as a rehabilitative “drug court” program,32 and the 
paper trail from the criminal court subsequently alerts an immigration officer to the 
evidence of the formal admission in the court proceeding.33 Immigration officials 
can also discover misconduct through arrest records and rap sheets. Even if the 
conduct did not lead to a prosecution or conviction, it may generate interest in the 
immigration interview, where questioning prompts admissions directly to an 
immigration or consular officer. An “admission” may also be rooted in a statement 
to a physician conducting the required medical examination to determine health-
related grounds of inadmissibility.  
Further, immigration application forms, reviewed under oath in interviews, are 
repetitive and thorough, asking in several different ways whether the applicant has 
criminal conduct or contact with the criminal system. In addition to requiring 
disclosure of arrests and convictions (“Have you EVER violated (or attempted or 
conspired to violate) any controlled substance law or regulation of a state, the United 
States, or a foreign country?”34), the process also requires answers about previously 
undetected bad acts (“have you ever committed an offense for which you were not 
arrested?”) followed shortly with the question about candor to immigration officials 
(“Have you EVER lied about, concealed, or misrepresented any information on an 
 
contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt, and 
(ii) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien’s 
liberty to be imposed.  
32   See, e.g., Diversion Programs in America’s Criminal Justice System: A Report by the Center 
for Prison Reform, Center of Prison Reform (Aug. 2015), https://centerforprisonreform. org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/Jail-Diversion-Programs-in-America.pdf, at 7–9 (“In 1968, the President’s 
Commission on Prisoner Rehabilitation and then the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and 
Control Act of 1970 recommended that US states use diversion programs for drug offenses. The first 
federal program was established through the Pretrial Services Act of 1982. By 2010, 45 US states had 
80 diversion laws and 298 diversion programs.”); See Matter of Mohammed, 27 I. & N. Dec. 91, 95 
(BIA 2017) (with the BIA electing to include admissions in the diversionary context as basis for 
satisfying the INA term “conviction,” in case of immigrant who successfully completed a drug court 
program, resulting in the charges against him being dropped).  
33   See, e.g., Martinez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 577 Fed. Appx. 969 (11th Cir. 2014) (Citing an 
admission made in the context of a diversionary program and rejecting argument that an admission for 
inadmissibility purposes carries immigration consequences only if the immigrant is presented the 
essential elements of the offense and concedes violation of each element, and instead holding that an 
admission in a diversionary program is properly a basis of a finding of inadmissibility and ineligibility 
for discretionary relief.).  
34   USCIS, Form I-485 Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status, page 10 
(emphasis in original).  
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application or petition to obtain a visa, other documentation required for entry into 
the United States, admission to the United States, or any other kind of immigration 
benefit?”). In other words, everyone who has ever committed any misdeed either 
admits it or risks making their case even worse by triggering additional 
inadmissibility by lying about it.35 This puritanical approach—that any person that 
has committed any drug offense should never be permitted to enter U.S. society—is 
inherently self-defeating, as it incentivizes lying, but it would take an act of Congress 
to ratchet down the consequences, and despite the occasional proposal,36 such 
progress reform is not on the horizon.  
Separately, immigration officials can allege additional inadmissibility via a 
separate ground, for having “reason to believe” that a person is (or has been) a 
trafficker in controlled substances.37 Thus, a non-citizen might defeat a serious-
sounding allegation at trial—on technicalities of constitutional or practical 
consideration, based on high burden of proof, or because of actual innocence—and 
still face a bar to entry. This “reason to believe” bar even extends to family members 
who have recently benefitted financially from the alleged wrongdoer.38  
At the “admissibility” phase, the sole drug crime that may be waived under the 
INA is a single offense relating to39 simple possession of thirty grams or less of 
 
35   With experimental drug use being widespread, statistically speaking, misrepresentation must 
be a recurring problem. See, e.g., Mary Emily O’Hara, New Study Finds Majority of Americans Have 
Smoked Marijuana, NBC NEWS (Apr. 17, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/ news/us-news/new-poll-
finds-majority-americans-have-smoked-pot-n747476.  
36   See, e.g., American Families United Act, H.R. 1036, 115th Cong. (2017) (providing broad 
discretion to immigration judges and also limiting the types of convictions that would count for 
immigration purposes).  
37   INA § 212(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C § 1182(a)(2)(C), Controlled substance traffickers.  
Any alien who the consular officer or the Attorney General knows or has reason to believe. 
(i) is or has been an illicit trafficker in any controlled substance or in any listed chemical 
(as defined in section 802 of title 21), or is or has been a knowing aider, abettor, assister, 
conspirator, or colluder with others in the illicit trafficking in any such controlled or listed 
substance or chemical, or endeavored to do so; or 
(ii) is the spouse, son, or daughter of an alien inadmissible under clause (i), has, within the 
previous 5 years, obtained any financial or other benefit from the illicit activity of that 
alien, and knew or reasonably should have known that the financial or other benefit was 
the product of such illicit activity, is inadmissible.  
38   See id.  
39   Also, prosecutions for multiple counts, such as both possession of cannabis and possession 
of paraphernalia, although the immigrant bears the burden of proof to establish, through a 
“circumstance specific” test, that the counts related to a single offense. Matter of Davey 26 I. & N. 
Dec. 37 (BIA 2012) (the phrase “a single offense involving possession for one’s own use of thirty 
grams or less of marijuana” calls for a circumstance-specific inquiry into the character of the alien’s 
unlawful conduct on a single occasion, not a categorical inquiry into the elements of a single statutory 
crime. An alien convicted of more than one statutory crime may be covered by the exception to 
deportability for an alien convicted of “a single offense involving possession for one’s own use of thirty 
grams or less of marijuana” if all the alien’s crimes were closely related to or connected with a single 
incident in which the alien possessed 30 grams or less of marijuana for his or her own use, provided 
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marijuana. And that waiver is discretionary. Further, unless the offense was over 
fifteen years old, the waiver requires a threshold factual showing of risk of “extreme 
hardship” to a qualifying relative—a U.S. citizen or resident spouse, parent, or 
child—in the event of the denial of the waiver, prior to the officer or immigration 
judge considering the exercise of their discretion.  
Once an immigrant is admitted to the United States, they remain subject to strict 
rules regarding controlled substance convictions.40 The only non-deportable drug 
offense is simple possession of less than thirty grams of cannabis. A second 
possessory offense triggers removability, as does any conviction relating to any drug 
other than cannabis and any offense that is not “possessory” in nature.  
Separately, the INA makes deportable any drug offense classified as an 
“aggravated felony,”41 defined as “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance”—a 
term not explicitly defined in the statute or, as yet, by the Supreme Court (as 
discussed, infra), other than being “commercial in nature.”42 The aggravated felony 
definition also includes any “drug trafficking crime,” defined as an offense 
(including an analogous state offense) that is felony under the federal Controlled 
Substances Act.43 Of course, under this counter-intuitive system, some of those 
“drug trafficking” crimes are not trafficking at all.  
There are two preferred ways for curing a controlled substance conviction. 
First, if the immigrant has had their residency for over five years and had been in 
the United States for seven years—subsequent to a lawful entry in any visa status 
prior to the date of the commission of a disqualifying crime—they may request 
discretionary relief, but only if they have no offense that is considered an aggravated 
felony. Thus, for purposes of the present discussion, any drug offense within seven 
years of a first admission into the United States will disqualify relief. Any federal 
drug felony (or the state equivalent thereof), or commercial offense also will 
disqualify.  
Second, if the conviction date is prior to April 24, 1996, different rules apply, 
as the offender is grandfathered into a scheme that existed prior to the amendments 
 
that none of those crimes was inherently more serious than simple possession.”).  
40   INA § 237(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B), Controlled substances 
(i) Conviction 
Any alien who at any time after admission has been convicted of a violation of (or a 
conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a 
foreign country relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of title 21), 
other than a single offense involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of 
marijuana, is deportable.  
41   See INA § 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B) (enumerating the aggravated felony 
“illicit trafficking in a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of title 21), including a drug 
trafficking crime (as defined in section 924(c) of title 18)”).  
42   See Lopez, supra note 4.  
43   See id.  
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to the INA via the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996 (IIRIRA), in which deportability was expanded and discretionary relief from 
removal was restricted.44   
Finally, all of this changes if the immigrant travels abroad at any time before 
they naturalize. Upon her return, she becomes re-subjected to the higher test of 
inadmissibility.45 For example, a cannabis possession offense (i.e. simple 
possession, under thirty grams) that did not trigger deportability now causes 
inadmissibility. Further, if the commission of that offense was within the first seven 
years of her initial entry to the U.S., it now bars cancellation of removal, under the 
“stop-time” rule.46 In this instance, the immigrant’s only recourse is the INA § 
212(h) waiver of inadmissibility, which in the case of lawful permanent residents 
has a “stop-time” rule that requires seven years of resident status, but “runs” until 
the initiation of proceedings. Thus, some residents may be eligible for this waiver 
(and its heightened requirement of showing “extreme hardship, prior to a 
discretionary consideration) who are not eligible for cancellation of removal, under 
that different “stop-time” rule (tolling at commission of the offense).  
Unfortunately for the immigrant, this issue dovetails with the modern detention 
scheme. Congress approved a system of mandatory detention in IIRIRA which, after 
two years of delays, went into effect on October 8, 1998.47 Under this mandate, 
immigrants “arriving” at the border found inadmissible for criminal reasons must be 
detained and are ineligible for bond.  
 
III. IMMIGRATION 201: THE “CATEGORICAL APPROACH” FOR DETERMINING 
WHETHER AN OFFENSE TRIGGERS A REMOVAL CONSEQUENCE. 
 
Based on the harsh realities of the immigration law, after 1996, more and more 
immigrants find themselves dependent upon hyper-technical arguments related to 
the examination of statutes, via the “categorical approach” (an elements-based test, 
 
44   See INA § 240A(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) Cancellation of Removal (the post-1996 program 
for discretionary relief from removal, requiring five years of lawful permanent residency, seven years 
continuous residence in any status subsequent to any entry (with the clock starting at admission and 
stopping at commission of a deportable offense), and no “aggravated felony;” c.f. INA § 212(c) 
(repealed), codified at 8 C.F.R. § 212.3, which before 1990 permitted waiver of any offense and after 
1990 permitted waiver of any offense with less than a five year sentence served, so long as the 
permanent resident had maintained a continuous domicile in the United States for seven years prior to 
the date of the adjudication of the waiver request).  
45   See INA § 101(a)(13)(c) (enumerating scheme where permanent residents re-become 
vulnerable “arriving aliens” after travel).  
46   A further question recently resolved by the Supreme Court, approved of hypothetical (non-
factual) inadmissibility serving to trigger stop-time. See Barton v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1442 (2020) 
(Whether a lawfully admitted permanent resident who is not seeking admission to the United States 
can be “render[ed] . . . inadmissible” for the purposes of the stop-time rule.).  
47   Matter of Adeniji, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1102 (BIA 1999).  
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in which the state statute of conviction must necessarily match each element of a 
generic federal standard),48 in order to prevent certain removal or establish eligibility 
for relief. Again, this requires close analysis of state crimes when compared to a 
federal standard. If the elements of the state offense are not necessarily the 
equivalent of the generic standard, the offense escapes federal immigration 
treatment.49 Over the years, it has a become bedrock principle that the Court does 
not prioritize state definitions over uniform federal standards derived from the 
statutory text and prevailing national norms.  
 
48   See, e.g., Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990); Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 
U.S. 183 (2007); Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013); Mathis v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 
2243, 2248 (2016) (in perhaps the best explanation of the technique, reiterating that the inquiry is one 
of strict “elemental” nature, without regarding to underlying facts: 
To determine whether a prior conviction is for generic burglary (or other listed crime) 
courts apply what is known as the categorical approach: They focus solely on whether the 
elements of the crime of conviction sufficiently match the elements of generic burglary, 
while ignoring the particular facts of the case. Distinguishing between elements and facts 
is therefore central to ACCA’s operation. ‘Elements’ are the ‘constituent parts’ of a crime’s 
legal definition—the things the ‘prosecution must prove to sustain a conviction.’ At a trial, 
they are what the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt to convict the defendant and at 
a plea hearing, they are what the defendant necessarily admits when he pleads guilty. Facts, 
by contrast, are mere real-world things—extraneous to the crime’s legal requirements. (We 
have sometimes called them ‘brute facts’ when distinguishing them from elements.) They 
are ‘circumstance[s]’ or ‘event[s]’ having no ‘legal effect [or] consequence’: In particular, 
they need neither be found by a jury nor admitted by a defendant. And ACCA, as we have 
always understood it, cares not a whit about them. A crime counts as ‘burglary’ under the 
Act if its elements are the same as, or narrower than, those of the generic offense. But if 
the crime of conviction covers any more conduct than the generic offense, then it is not an 
ACCA ‘burglary’—even if the defendant’s actual conduct (i.e., the facts of the crime) fits 
within the generic offense’s boundaries.).  
See also Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S.Ct. 1562 (2017) (explaining that to determine the generic 
federal offense for comparison in the categorical approach, congressional understanding of a term it 
used is surmised by looking to prevailing norms throughout the states).  
49   See Taylor, supra note 48, at 590 (in the foundational case on this subject, this Court 
established why the Eleventh Circuit was there wrong to defer a state standard: “It seems to us to be 
implausible that Congress intended the meaning of “burglary” for purposes of § 924(e) to depend on 
the definition adopted by the State of conviction.”). 
Repeated precedent of the Court, applying Taylor, further illustrates the fallacy of the various 
Circuit’s willingness to eliminate elements of “generic” crimes in order for state offenses to trigger 
federal sentencing treatment. For example, under some Circuits’ logic, a federal enhancement for 
“burglary” would apply to state offenses that lacked elements of “unlawful entry” or a necessary 
relation to a “structure,” if Congress did not explicitly enumerate elements of “burglary” when it 
utilized the term. In addition to Taylor, this Court rejected those ideas in Descamps v. United States, 
570 U.S. 254 (2013) (California burglary, not requiring unlawful entry) and Mathis v. United States, 
136 S.Ct. 2243 (2016) (Iowa burglary, allowing non-“structure” locus of offense), both of which held 
that a state offense must match the elements of the federal generic crime to trigger sentence 
enhancement. Similarly, federal deportability as “aggravated felonies” would attach to state simple 
possession cases, if the state treated this conduct as a felony. As discussed, the Supreme Court rejected 
that state-centric logic in Lopez.  
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Remarkably, thus far, every post-IIRIRA drug case to reach the Supreme Court 
has been resolved in favor the immigrant, proving a trend—regardless of 
administration—that the Department of Justice tends to overreach in this context, 
erroneously assigning removability in an impermissibly over-expansive reading of 
the INA.  
In the “aggravated felony” context, the Supreme Court has unambiguously held 
that to be a “drug trafficking crime” (a term of art both torturing semantics and 
including every federal drug-related felony, regardless of whether “trafficking” is 
involved), a state offense must necessarily be the equivalent of a federal felony, 
regardless of the state punishing scheme.50 The Court later held that this could not 
be a based on a “hypothetical” prosecution, reiterating that the categorical inquiry is 
regarding the elements of the statute charged, not what crime theoretically could 
have been charged.51 The Court expanded this logic to the inverse.Thus, because the 
federal statute treats almost all “delivery” offenses as felonies, but has a limited 
exception (for social sharing of a small amount of cannabis for no remuneration), a 
state offense that lacks that same exception will necessarily be over-inclusive and 
fail to trigger aggravated felony treatment.52 Finally, the Court held that the drug 
involved in the conviction must necessarily relate to one in the federal controlled 
substance act and where the drug’s identity is ambiguous, the offense may avoid 
immigration treatment at all.53 Outside of the paraphernalia context, however, the 
identity of the controlled substance is typically an element of the offense.54 
 
50   See Lopez, supra note 4.  
51   See Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563 (2010) (rejecting theory that two separate 
state possessory offenses, combined, could trigger aggravated felony treatment as the equivalent of the 
federal felony of recidivist possession, where the federal “recidivist” offense—the one possessory 
offense the federal government treats as a felony—has an element of the existence of a prior conviction, 
but the state offense did not).  
52   See Moncrieffe, supra note 4 (rejecting Georgia delivery offense as “drug trafficking” 
(federal felony) aggravated felony, where federal CSA has carve-out for misdemeanor treatment of 
social sharing of small amount of marijuana for no remuneration, but Georgia does not, i.e. the state 
treated all delivery offenses as felonies, so was overinclusive).  
53   See Mellouli, supra note 4 (holding that where a Kansas paraphernalia conviction did not 
require the identification of the specific drug involved—just that the conviction related to “a controlled 
substance” as defined by Kansas—and where the Kansas schedule of controlled substances was broader 
than the federal CSA, the elements of the paraphernalia offense categorically failed to establish the 
offense necessarily violated the federal CSA and thus escaped immigration consequences). Since 1965, 
the BIA has also recognized that that the immigration consequences triggered by drug convictions and 
controlled substances offenses listed in the INA, reach only those substances that are regulated by the 
federal law. See Matter of Paulus, 11 I. & N. Dec. 274 (BIA 1965) (terminating proceedings because 
conviction was based on state law that included some drugs not penalized as narcotics under federal 
law).  
54   See Guillen v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 910 F.3d 1174 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding that the identity of 
a controlled substance is an element of an offense where a state defendant may be charged with two 
counts of possessing different drugs, in a single indictment relating to a single set of facts (i.e. having 
two types of illegal drugs in one’s pocket at the same time is two crimes, not one)). Citing United States 
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Determining if this is true, in a particular state scheme, requires analysis of state 
appellate decisions, often not an easy task.55  
 
IV. CRIMMIGRATION: MODERN PROBLEMS (ADVANCED STUDIES) 
 
With past as preamble, we arrive back at the thesis of the article, a framing of 
remaining modern novel theories for the uniform and accurate application of the 
CSA and the INA to satisfy congressional intent and generate proper outcomes for 
convicted immigrants. The author teaches and litigates from Florida, which happens 
to have been the epicenter of two major schools of legal challenges that have national 
importance. The former, regarding the equivalency of drug definitions, reached its 
agency apex in Summer 2019, with the BIA rendering a published decision rejecting 
a theory that dissonance between the Florida and federal cannabis definitions should 
result in non-deportability for the immigrant. This topic has now launched into the 
Circuit Courts, and proper outcomes are discussed, infra.  
The latter topic has to do with proper determination of whether drug-related 
deportation grounds must be construed as having a mens rea requirement. This issue 
has roots in the 1914 Harrison Narcotic Tax Act, but in 2014, the BIA revived and 
invoked archaic pre-CSA standards to reject immigrants’ arguments that mens rea 
is an essential element for “aggravated felony” treatment. In a parallel case, the 
Supreme Court has taken up the question—of the significance of mens rea as an 
element of a state offense, in order to trigger federal consequences—in the context 
of an ACCA sentencing enhancement, in Shular v United States.56 With briefing, 
 
v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993), the court reasoned that because double jeopardy prohibits being charged 
twice for the same offense, the identity of the substance must be an element, concluding, “in short, 
because the Florida Supreme Court has told us that the elements of possession of marijuana and 
possession of a hallucinogen are different, it has implicitly told us that the identity of the substance 
possessed is an element of possession.”); see also Bah v. Barr, 950 F.3d 203, 209 (4th Cir. 2020) 
(finding similarly, citing Virginia case where “the defendant was prosecuted for two counts of drug 
possession where he had possessed a single capsule that contained two controlled substances, heroin 
and fentanyl.”).  
55   See Bah, supra note 54, at 212 (Thacker, J., dissenting) (Revealing the complexity of 
answering this question, particularly where state precedent is underdeveloped or ambiguous: “In 
my view, the majority opinion improperly truncates the proper analysis here at the very first step, 
by concluding that Virginia courts have clearly spoken on the issue at hand, that is, whether 
controlled substance identity is an element of Appellant's offense of conviction. In support of the 
opinion that controlled substance identity is an element, the majority leans on Virginia case law. 
But, respectfully, a single ambiguous published state appellate court decision paired with an 
unpublished appellate memorandum decision do not clearly state anything definitive. To the 
contrary, here, where we cannot be certain as to whether the specific identity of a controlled 
substance is an element of Virginia law, we cannot determine that Petitioner's prior offense is a 
categorical match to the INA-defined offense. Therefore, we cannot allow the Virginia offense 
to trigger federal immigration consequences. This is too harsh a consequence in the face of such 
ambiguity.”).  
56   Shular v. United States, 140 S.Ct. 779 (2020).  
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argument, and decision in Shular coinciding with the drafting of this article, the 
present moment constitutes a last chance to pontificate on formerly-valid theories 
and first chance to reframe the decision and its revised implications for immigrants.  
 
A. Federalism Means That States Are Free to Create Their Own Unique 
Definitions of Controlled Substances, but Shouldn’t These Choices Then Be 
Acknowledged and Credited by the Federal Government? 
 
Throughout the INA, wherever Congress references “controlled substances,” it 
does so very specifically, by cross-refencing its own list of drugs, which is “defined 
in section 802 of title 21.”57 As discussed, the Supreme Court has taken up the 
question of state statutes that are silent on the identity of the controlled substance 
involved in a conviction. In that context, the element of the crime is merely that the 
conduct related to any controlled substance (typically in a paraphernalia prosecution, 
as in Mellouli, supra, in which the facts related a drug stored in the defendant’s 
sock), as defined by the state. Thus, it is relevant whether the state schedules of 
controlled substances align with the federal schedules. If a state’s schedules are 
broader—over-inclusive in any way—the immigrant gets the benefit of a 
presumption that their conviction rested upon this “least culpable” conduct, i.e. the 
controlled substance not on the federal schedules, and thereby avoid immigration 
consequences. The underlying facts do not matter, because this is a legal question.  
The federal immigration scheme has an interest in uniformity, or at least having 
a national minimum legal floor which must be reached before a state offense triggers 
a federal consequence. Unfortunately, as the 50 states have legislated for themselves 
in the 50 years since the passage of the CSA, the national non-uniformity in criminal 
definitions is significant. States have adopted ingenious and interesting variations 
on every aspect of crimes, based on each state’s respective local interests. These 
variations extend past the lists of controlled substances, down to the minutiae of how 
 
57   See e.g. 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(43)(B) (the type of drug subject to the aggravated felony 
definition); 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (inadmissibility for “a violation of (or a conspiracy or 
attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a 
controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of title 21)”); 8 U.S.C. §1227(a)(2)(B)(i) Conviction 
(“[a]ny alien who at any time after admission has been convicted of a violation of (or a conspiracy or 
attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a 
controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of title 21), other than a single offense involving 
possession for one's own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana, is deportable.”); Anti-Drug Abuse Act 
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 100 Stat. 3207-1, 3207-47 (1986) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. 
1182) (which “substituted ‘any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country 
relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of title 21)’ for ‘any law or regulation 
relating to the illicit possession of or traffic in narcotic drugs or marihuana, or who has been convicted 
of a violation of, or a conspiracy to violate, any law or regulation governing or controlling the taxing, 
manufacture, production, compounding, transportation, sale, exchange, dispensing, giving away, 
importation, exportation, or the possession for the purpose of the manufacture, production, 
compounding, transportation, sale, exchange, dispensing, giving away, importation, or exportation of 
opium, coca leaves, heroin, marihuana, any salt derivative or preparation of opium or coca leaves or 
isonipecaine or any addiction-forming or addiction-sustaining opiate.’”).  
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each controlled substance is defined. This section addresses the consequence of state 
election to adopt unique definitions of common drugs, and how and why that should 
impact immigration consequences.  
 
B. The Cocaine Example: When a State Makes a Chemically Distinct (and Highly 
Technical) Definition for Purposes of the State Offense 
 
In 2018, the BIA singled out an aggressive challenge to deportability predicated 
upon a Florida conviction for possession of cocaine. The BIA published a call for 
amicus curiae parties to join in a round of supplemental briefing.58 The respondent 
disputed that his conviction for violation of Florida Statute §§ 893.13(6)(a) and 
893.101 constituted a controlled substances offense, i.e. that it related to a controlled 
substance, “as enumerated in 21 U.S.C. § 802,” the link between the federal 
immigration laws and the federal CSA.59 Of course, his conviction record 
established that he was convicted of something Florida called “cocaine,” but the 
question was whether it necessarily was cocaine.  
The theory built upon the Supreme Court’s unambiguous holding in Mellouli 
that removability is not triggered where “the state law under which he was charged 
categorically ‘relat[ed] to a controlled substance,’ but was not limited to substances 
defined in [21 U.S.C. §802].”60 Florida defines the controlled substance of “cocaine” 
in a manner that is distinctly broader than the federal definition. Because removal 
grounds are “limited to substances ‘defined’ in 21 U.S.C. § 802” and there is no 
ambiguity that the word “defined” should be strictly construed, the immigrant 
argued that the Florida cocaine offense is not analogous to the federally defined 
controlled substance. The overbreadth would dictate that the immigrant would win.61 
Florida Statutes establish a state definition of cocaine as: “Cocaine or ecgonine, 
including any of their stereoisomers, and any salt, compound, derivative, or 
preparation of cocaine or ecgonine.”62 
 
58   Ultimately, briefs in support were filed by the American Immigration Lawyers Association 
(AILA) and the George Washington University School of Law Immigration Clinic; a brief in opposition 
was filed by the restrictionist group Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR). Copies in 
possession of author.  
59   See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(2)(A)(i)(II).  
60   Mellouli, 135 S.Ct. at 1988.  
61   If the BIA reviewed the Florida definition of a “cocaine” and determined that the statute 
categorically included “cocaine” that is outside the federal definition, the “least culpable conduct” test 
would dictate the result: the Florida offense is categorically not a “controlled substance” offense as 
defined by the CSA. See also Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 1684 (“we must presume that the conviction 
‘rested upon [nothing] more than the least of th[e] acts’ criminalized, and then determine whether even 
those acts are encompassed by the generic federal offense.”).  
62   Fla. Stat. § 893.03(a)(4) (2019) (emphasis added).  
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In contrast, the Federal statute defines cocaine as: “Cocaine, its salts, optical 
and geometric isomers, and salts of isomers.”63 
The argument was that a plain reading of the statute establishes that Florida 
proscribes a class of substances broader than the federal definition, namely 
“compounds,” “derivatives,” and “preparations” of cocaine, that the Florida statute 
contemplates as distinct from “isomers” and “salts.” Because the statute uses the 
conjunctive “and,” the statute clearly contemplates that the “salt, compound, 
derivative, or preparation” is a separate, non-redundant class of substances that is 
distinct from “stereoisomers.” Similarly, it would render the distinction “salt, 
compound, derivative, or preparation” superfluous, if all four categories constituted 
“salts.”  
Even if he threaded this needle, to prevail, the immigrant also had to distinguish 
the listing of cocaine within the federal drug schedules enumerated at 21 U.S.C. § 
812, which are incorporated by reference within 21 U.S.C. § 802. This definition is 
arguably broader, as it relates to, inter alia: “Cocaine, its salts, optical and geometric 
isomers and salts of isomers [ . . . ]or any compound, mixture, or preparation which 
contains any quantity of any of the substances referred to in this paragraph.”64 
As happened in that case, the immigration judge acknowledged that, even 
accounting for the broader sweep of the second definition from Schedule II, there is 
still distinguishing language between the federal and the Florida definitions.65 
Despite that, the judge had dismissed any substantive analysis, opining “the Court 
firmly believes that Congress does not expect the Court to conduct a comparison of 
the chemical composition of a cocaine mixture versus the chemical composition of 
a cocaine derivative. Immigration Judges are not chemists.”66  
That may be the case, but of course, chemists are chemists, so rather than rely 
on the mere semantics of the respective definitions, the immigrant filed an 
explanation of a chemist, Dr. Douglas Heller, PhD,67 explaining and illustrating 
(complete with molecular modeling graphics) the reasons by which the Florida 
definition is overinclusive relative to the federal definition, particularly as it relates 
to various isomers.  
 
63   18 U.S.C. § 802(17)(D).  
64   21 U.S.C. § 812, Schedule II(a)(4).  
65   Matter of C- (unpublished), transcript on file with the author, who co-represented the case at 
the trial and BIA, including the aforementioned round of supplemental briefing (emphasis added).  
66   Id.  
67   PhD, University of Chicago; author of textbook, Visualizing Everyday Chemistry (John 
Wiley and Sons, 2016).  
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 As Prof. Heller explained, there are aspects of the definitions that align, but 
others that do not:  
 
1. [T]here is no distinguishing between the two definitions on the basis 
of salts;  
2. [T]he Florida definition provides for any derivative of cocaine 
whereas the federal definition does not. A large number of 
compounds, therefore, fall under the Florida definition of cocaine but 
not under the federal definition;  
3. The federal definition of cocaine specifies “optical and geometric 
isomers” whereas the Florida definition specifies “stereoisomers”. 
Stereoisomers come in two varieties: enantiomers, also known as 
optical isomers, and diastereomers, of which geometric isomers are a 
subtype, as shown in the diagram at the top of the next page. Since 
there are diastereomers that are not geometric isomers, the Florida 
definition of cocaine, which encompasses all stereoisomers of 
cocaine, is broader than the federal definition, which encompasses 
optical isomers and geometric isomers (a subtype of diastereomer)[.]”  
 
Prof. Heller’s findings were consistent with the peer-reviewed evidence regarding 
scientific nomenclature cited by amici.68  
Despite all objective evidence supporting the technical overbreadth of the 
Florida statute, the BIA still rejected the argument, but in an unpublished opinion.  
The BIA noted that the defense theory was reminiscent of the “isomer defense”69 
which Congress had taken steps to undermine, in 1984, by amending the definition 
of cocaine to incorporate the various isomers.  
Admittedly, the scientific discussion is a difficult one, so the cocaine example 
may not have been the ideal test case for the theory that state deviation from CSA 
definitions should have consequences. Put another way, as the BIA noted, 
 
[T]he chemist conclusively states that Florida’s definition of cocaine is 
broader than cocaine, but gives no examples of an actual isomer that is a 
diastereomer but not a geometric isomer of cocaine [ . . . Further,] the 
record does not establish a realistic probability, not a theoretical 
 
68   D. Burke and D.J. Henderson, Chirality: a blueprint for the future, British J. of Anesthesia 
88 (4): 563-76 (2002) (illustrating fundamental distinctions in nomenclatures, i.e. “chirality” (e.g. 
scientific terms of art, assigned the use of the terminology of the International Union of Pure and 
Applied Chemistry (IUPAC)) of various distinct chemical isomers), to prove, inter alia, that the Florida 
inclusion of stereoisomers establishes that the Florida scheme is broader than the federal scheme, which 
includes the narrower categories of “optical and geometric isomers.”  
69   See United States v. Ross, 719 F.2d 615 (2nd Cir. 1983) (accepting that cocaine’s former 
definition, i.e. the § 802 definition, supra note 63, lacked reference to specific isomers and was 
susceptible to challenge).  
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possibility, that the State would apply its statute to the non-generic 
conduct.70  
 
C. The Cannabis Example (Stalks, Salts, and Seeds): When a State Abandons the 
Federal Definition in an Easily Comprehendible Way 
 
Fortunately, in parallel litigation the BIA was forced to confront an easier 
question to visualize: the consequences of Florida’s distinct definition of cannabis. 
Unfortunately, the BIA ruled against that immigrant as well, in the published 
decision Matter of Navarro Guadarrama.71 The BIA there also noted that Navarro 
had failed to show it was realistic—through an exemplar decision, his own or 
another case—that the State would prosecute and convict solely based on non-
generic substance.72  
“Cannabis” presents an ideal test case for the federal courts to address this 
question of dissonant drug definitions. Florida formerly shared the CSA definition, 
but in 1979 departed from the federal (and Uniform Controlled Substances Act) 
definitions. Florida now categorically defines “cannabis” in broader terms than used 
at 21 U.S.C. § 802. Florida courts unambiguously acknowledge this change.73 The 
new language is obvious and purposeful: 
 
“Cannabis” means all parts of any plant of the genus Cannabis, whether 
growing or not; the seeds thereof; the resin extracted from any part of the 
plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or 
preparation of the plant or its seeds or resin.  
 
The federal substance is enumerated as follows: 
 
(16) The term ‘marihuana’ means all parts of the plant Cannabis sativa L., 
whether growing or not; the seeds thereof; the resin extracted from any 
part of such plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, 
mixture, or preparation of such plant, its seeds or resin. Such term does not 
include the mature stalks of such plant, fiber produced from such stalks, 
oil or cake made from the seeds of such plant, any other compound, 
manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such mature 
 
70   See Matter of C- (unpublished).  
71   Matter of Navarro Guadarrama, 27 I&N Dec. 560 (BIA 2019).  
72   Id. at 562-563.  
73   See c.f. Purifoy v State, 359 So.2d 446 (Fla. 1978); Jordan v. State, 419 So.2d 363 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1982).  
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stalks (except the resin extracted therefrom), fiber, oil, or cake, or the 
sterilized seed of such plant which is incapable of germination.74  
 
Under Florida’s former scheme (until 1979, when it still conformed with the CSA 
definition), the police had to separate the legal parts of the plant from the prohibited 
parts and weigh the contraband, prior to submitting to case for prosecution. This is 
no longer so. One might assume that political determinations, like Florida’s, to adopt 
a “special” definition beyond the prevailing national norm, must be reflected in the 
outcomes in immigration proceedings.75 The BIA would say “no.”  
If there is a silver lining to Navarro, it is that if an immigrant presents an 
exemplar prosecution that explicitly related to “stalks” or “stems,” they would 
escape immigration treatment, even under Navarro’s holding. A criminal defense 
attorney could aid in shaping such a specific plea.76 Further, just as the INA requires 
a conviction of over 30 grams of cannabis to trigger deportability, Florida makes 
distinctions in weight, resulting in misdemeanor (20 grams or less) and felony (over 
20 grams) charges. The BIA acknowledged in Navarro that “[i]n addition to 
expanding the definition of cannabis, the legislature increased the 
misdemeanor/felony threshold for simple possession from 5 to 20 grams to make 
allowances for the possible weight of stalks and stems.”77 Being as Florida and the 
BIA agree that any weight of cannabis includes non-federally proscribed parts of the 
plant, it would seem obvious that an immigration judge could never find clear and 
convincing evidence that a conviction necessarily related to over 30 grams of 
federally-defined cannabis. Any weight would be adulterated in non-criminal 
material. Thus, while an immigrant might never be able to prove a conviction only 
relates to federal cannabis (for inadmissibility purposes, where any violation bars 
admission), the government could similarly never meet the threshold showing of 30 
grams (for deportability, where a first offense escapes removal consequences, if 
under this limit), since Florida law enforcement has to always weigh the good, mixed 
with the bad, so the exact ratio is always ambiguous.78  
 
74   21 U.S.C. § 802(16) (emphasis added).  
75   See Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S.Ct. 1562 (2017) (addressing that a state offense is 
“special” relative to the majority-state generic standard, it categorically fails to satisfy that standard 
and serve as basis for immigration consequence).  
76   Indeed, defense counsel likely needs to try to cultivate this outcome, given their need to 
effectively counsel and advocate for their immigrant client in a way informed by the fragility of 
immigration status. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (finding constitutional right to 
effective criminal counsel extended to accurate advice regarding immigration consequences.).  
77   See Navarro Guadarrama, at 562, n.3.  
78   This theory, regarding the combined weight of contraband and legal parts of the cannabis 
plant, has relatively broad applicability. Bermuda, for example, has an irregular definition, as Colorado 
formerly did. See Bermuda Misuse of Drugs Act 1972 : 159(1) (“‘cannabis’ (except in the expression 
‘cannabis resin’) means any plant or part thereof within the botanically designated genus Cannabis, but 
does not include any fiber produced from the stalk of the plant,” thereby permitting convictions for 
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Admittedly, it doesn’t really have to be this complicated. The commonsense 
approach would be to look at the behavior of Florida and similar states. If a state 
government purposefully broadens a criminal definition to include behavior that the 
federal doesn’t criminalize, the federal government should listen, and not give any 
full faith and credit to these state decisions. It would be federalism in action.79  
 
D. The Supreme Court Takes on Mens Rea Requirements 
 
1. The Mind Must Be Culpable for The Act to Be Criminal? A Short History 
of Drugs and Mens Rea, In Statutory Interpretation and Before the Supreme 
Court 
 
Returning to the title of this article, it may come as a surprise to the reader that 
the BIA has declared that immigrants are rendered deportable and would-be 
immigrants are inadmissible based on state controlled substance offenses that lack 
an element of culpable knowledge by the defendant that they knew they were 
possessing any illicit substance. This section will explore the intellectual honesty of 
this position in a variety of contexts. The BIA has published decisions regarding 
mens rea in possessory and “illicit trafficking” aggravated felony charges.80 The 
U.S. Supreme Court presently has Shular under consideration.  
At issue are the mens rea requirements of Subtitle M of the Anti-Drug Abuse 
Act of 1986, entitled the “Narcotics Traffickers Deportation Act,”81 which amended 
the drug exclusion ground in (former) § 212(a)(23) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (“INA,” “Act”), now located at INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II).82 In the 
same general era, Congress passed the Immigration and Nationality Act 
Amendments of 1981 (providing a waiver of inadmissibility for a single possessory 
 
ungerminated seeds, etc.); C.R.S. 18-18-102(18) (permitting convictions for stalks).  
79   It also would be consistent with every Supreme Court addressing drug deportability. See e.g. 
Lopez, Carachuri-Rosendo, Mellouli, Moncrieffe.  
80   See Matter of Esqueda; Matter of L-G-H-. Matter of L-G-H- was taken up by the BIA 
immediately adjacent to the BIA being reversed by the Eleventh Circuit in Matter of Donawa, on 
account of the Florida “sale or delivery” statute being rejected as the equivalent of the federal offense, 
based on the mens rea requirement. The BIA considered the meaning of “illicit trafficking in a 
controlled substance, and finding it ambiguous, imputed a mens rea requirement. The BIA failed to 
canvas jurisdictions to determine the prevailing norms at the time of modification of the INA, as it had 
done in every other aggravated felony that it has considered.  
81   Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, §100 Stat. 3207-1, 3207-47 (1986) 
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §1182).  
82   8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (inadmissibility triggered by: “[A] violation of, or a 
conspiracy to violate, any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating 
to a controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. § 
802)).”).  
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offense involving cannabis),83 and the Immigration Act of 1990,84 but neither of 
these statutes affirmatively addressed mens rea requirements, although these statutes 
also impacted the immigration consequences of controlled substances convictions.  
Federal law has evolved to include mens rea requirements in drug offenses. In 
1922, when the sale and consumption of cocaine was regulated incidentally via a tax 
statute (in what, with help of retrospect, were curiously permissive times for drug 
use), the Harrison Narcotic Tax Act (1914),85 the Supreme Court permitted “drug” 
(really tax violation) convictions in the absence of mens rea.86 The Supreme Court 
has never blindly adhered to its holding in Balint. Instead, the Court has critically 
discussed it and explicitly limited its application to the context of the times in which 
it was decided, noting “the conclusion reached in [ ] Balint [ ] has our approval and 
adherence for the circumstances to which it was there applied.”87  
By 1952, the Supreme Court concluded that Balint was legitimate only because 
at the time, the regulation of controlled substances was novel. Congress was thus 
legislating on a blank slate, rather than against a well-developed backdrop of state 
law jurisprudence that could inform its intent:  
 
Congressional silence as to mental elements in an Act merely adopting 
into federal statutory law a concept of crime already so well defined in 
common law and statutory interpretation by the states may warrant quite 
 
83   Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-116, § 95 Stat. 1611, 
1616 (1981) (codified as amended in 8 U.S.C. §1182).  
84   Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 104 Stat. 4978 (1990) (codified as amended 
in 8 U.S.C. 1101).  
85   See generally Harrison Narcotics Tax Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-223, § 38 Stat. 785 (1915) 
(regulated sale of, but not criminalizing, cocaine); see also Lisa N. Sacco, Cong. Research Serv., 
R43749, Drug Enforcement in the United States: History, Policy, and Trends 3 (2014) (“Under the 
Harrison Act, practitioners were authorized to prescribe opiates and cocaine[.]”).  
86   See Balint, at 251-52.  
87   Morissette, at 260. As the Eastern District of New York has explained, 
[T]he statute [at issue in Balint] must be understood in context. It predated the era during 
which all possession and sale of drugs came to be regarded as serious crimes. Aside from 
its penalty, it fairly can be characterized as a regulation. It required manufacturers and 
distributors of certain narcotics [including opium and cocaine] to register with the IRS, pay 
a special tax of one dollar per year and record all transactions on forms provided by the 
IRS. 
Id. §§ 1-3 and 8. 
As a case about strict liability and narcotics, Balint has no application today. Prior to the Harrison 
Act, narcotics had been freely available without prescription. This change by tax statute was a first 
modest transitional step towards the present complex and serious criminal statutes dealing with 
narcotics offenses. They have come to be treated as among the most serious of crimes in the federal 
criminal code. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 960 (mandatory minimum sentences as high as 10 years for 
certain drug offenses); 848(e) (possible sentence of death for drug offenses in which killing results). 
United States v. Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F.Supp. 485, 507 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (emphasis added).  
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contrary inferences than the same silence in creating an offense new to 
general law, for whose definition the courts have no guidance except the 
Act . . . [T]he offense before this Court in the Balint [ ] case [was] of this 
latter class . . . . 88 
 
By 1986, Congress was no longer legislating against a blank slate when it came 
to criminalizing controlled substance violations. In the 64 years that had passed 
between Balint (1922) and the 1986 amendments to the ACCA, states and the federal 
government had developed a wide-ranging compendium of criminal laws governing 
controlled substance offenses. As the Morissette court noted, in 1952:  
 
Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition 
and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the 
cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of 
learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to 
the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed. In such case, absence of 
contrary direction may be taken as satisfaction with widely accepted 
definitions, not as a departure from them.89  
 
In modern criminal and immigration legislation, Congress was well aware that 
drug offenses included a mens rea element, as Congress itself made clear by 1970 
when it passed the federal CSA and President Nixon then subsequently exercised 
the authority under the CSA to create the Drug Enforcement Agency, in 1973, 
exclusively to enforce those laws.90  
Unfortunately, instead of using these modern norms that had informed 
Congress, the BIA has done the opposite. In the possessory context, in 1994, the 
BIA based its decision in Matter of Esqueda on the public welfare cases, making 
deportable drug offenses lacking a mens rea element and rejecting arguments that 
mens rea was a necessary element of an offense.91 There is no argument that the 
aged cases the BIA cited, Balint (1922), and Shevlin-Carpenter (1910) were (or are) 
relevant, accurate, and not superseded by more pertinent statutes. The 
counterargument is simply overwhelming, evidenced by the Uniform Controlled 
Substances Act, the laws of 48 state jurisdictions, and the federal CSA, all of which 
establish a requirement of culpable mens rea for possessory controlled substance 
offenses.  
 
88   Morissette, at 262.  
89   Morissette, 342 U.S. at 263.  
90   Sacco, supra note 83, at 5-6.  
91   See Matter of Esqueda, at 861-862 (while addressing the immigration consequences of the 
California scheme that was merely silent regarding mens rea, the BIA mused upon the subject of the 
immigration consequences of a presumptive scheme as well.).  
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Of course, the modern criminal scheme regarding controlled substances has 
long superseded its primeval beginnings and mere “incidental purpose” to tax law, 
fully mooting the utility of Balint.92  
Shular presented a great vehicle to correct the record. It arose in the federal 
sentencing context, which shares its analytical jurisprudence with immigration 
cases.93 As further evidenced by the Uniform Controlled Substances Act and the 
laws of all 50 state jurisdictions (in 1986), the “widely accepted definition”—at the 
time that Congress created the § 924(e)(2) 15-year minimum sentence for those 
previously convicted of “serious drug offenses”—was the universal requirement of 
culpable mens rea for all elements in controlled substance trafficking offenses.94 It 
was under this understanding of the uniform national landscape, in 1986, that 
Congress enacted the term “serious drug offense” in § 924(e)(2).  
 
2. Shouldn’t You Have to Mean to Commit a Drug Offense?  
The Florida Anomaly: The Road to Shular  
 
“[T]he requirement of some mens rea for a crime . . . is the rule of, rather than 
the exception to, Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence.”95 When it comes to state 
statutes penalizing the sale of controlled substances, Florida is decidedly the 
exception.96 Among the States, Florida alone presumes a culpable mens rea 
regarding the illicit nature of a controlled substance.97 Under this statute, innocence 
 
92   Balint, 258 U.S. at 253 (emphasis added). It further must not go unremarked upon that Balint 
is a thinly reasoned decision, remarkable for its brevity and oversimplification of the issues presented. 
See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 252 n.10 (1952) (acknowledging “overstatement” by Chief Justice Taft, in 
Balint).  
93   See, e.g. Descamps, at 266 n.3 (Citing Moncrieffe, an immigration case, to support reasoning 
in decision regarding the ACCA); Mathis, at 2255 n. 5 (same); Shular, at 783 (relying on analysis in 
immigration cases Esquivel-Quintana, 137 S.Ct. at 1572 (2017), and Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U. S. 
478, 132 S. Ct. 1166, 182 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2012)).  
94   See Controlled Substances Act of 1970; the federal Controlled Substances Analogue 
Enforcement Act of 1986 (both requiring element of mens rea in federal offenses); see also Dawkins 
v. State, 313 Md. 638 (Md. 1988), State v. Adkins, 96 So.3d 412 (Fla. 2012), State v Cleppe, 96 Wn.2d 
373 (Wash. 1981); State v. Bradshaw, 152 Wash. 2d 528, 541, 98 P.3d 1190, 1196 (2004) (referencing 
or cataloging the rapid adoption, by 48 states, of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, and 
cataloguing uniform mens rea requirement in all 50 states, prior to Florida’s changes in 2002, in which 
the sole statutes lacking mens rea requirements were for the crimes of possession in Washington and 
North Dakota).  
95   Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994).  
96   See id.  
97   Fla. Stat. § 893.101 (1-3) (2002) states the following: 
(1) The Legislature finds that the cases of Scott v. State, Slip Opinion No. SC94701 (Fla. 
2002) and Chicone v. State, 684 So.2d 736 (Fla. 1996), holding that the state must 
prove that the defendant knew of the illicit nature of a controlled substance found in 
his or her actual or constructive possession, were contrary to legislative intent.  
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is an affirmative defense, which triggers a reiterated presumption of guilt if raised. 
Since Florida created this unique scheme in 2002, the statute has been the subject of 
extensive litigation in the constitutional,98 criminal,99 and immigration100 arenas. 
These have taken on national importance, based on being the subject of published 
decisions by the BIA and Eleventh Circuit, and now, a pending decision of the U.S. 
Supreme Court.  
It is uncontroverted that Florida is the only jurisdiction in the country to 
presume culpable mens rea regarding the illicit nature of a controlled substance in 
criminal prosecutions for drug sales.101 It also is unambiguous. Since the scheme’s 
enactment in 2002, Florida courts have predictably and consistently reiterated that 
culpable mens rea of illicitness is always presumed. To prove a cocaine possession 
charge, the state must prove that the defendant knew that he possessed a substance, 
which was in fact cocaine, but the state does not have to prove that the defendant 
knew it was cocaine.102 Instead, the defendant may raise by affirmative defense the 
claim that he did not know the substance was cocaine. Similarly, a Florida defendant 
can concede all the elements of the offense, i.e., possession of a specific substance 
and knowledge of the presence of the substance, and still be able to assert the defense 
that he did not know of the illicit nature of the specific substance.103  
 
(2) The Legislature finds that knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled substance is 
not an element of any offense under this chapter. Lack of knowledge of the illicit 
nature of a controlled substance is an affirmative defense to the offenses of this 
chapter.  
(3) In those instances, in which a defendant asserts the affirmative defense described in 
this section, the possession of a controlled substance, whether actual or constructive, 
shall give rise to a permissive presumption that the possessor knew of the illicit 
nature of the substance. It is the intent of the Legislature that, in those cases where 
such an affirmative defense is raised, the jury shall be instructed on the permissive 
presumption provided in this subsection.  
98   See Shelton v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 691 F.3d 1348, 1354–55 (11th Cir. 2012) (reversing the 
district court’s finding of unconstitutionality and holding that under AEDPA, deference to the state 
supreme court and state legislature are required absent controlling Supreme Court precedent); see also 
State v. Adkins, 96 So.3d 412 (Fla. 2012) (rejecting due process challenge).  
99   United States v. Smith, 775 F.3d 1262, 1267 (11th Cir. 2014) (internal citation omitted).  
100  See generally Donawa; Choizilme.  
101  See, e.g., Adkins, 96 So. 3d at 423 n.1 (Fla. 2012) (“A national survey reveals that Florida's 
drug law is clearly out of the mainstream. Except for Washington, which eliminates mens rea for simple 
drug possession offenses, and now Florida, the remaining forty-eight states require knowledge to be an 
element of a narcotics possession law, either by statute or by judicial decision”); Dawkins, at 647 n.8; 
649 n.10 (noting broad adoption of Uniform Controlled Substances Act and canvassing jurisdictions 
with explicit mens rea requirements).  
102  See, e.g., Miller v. State, 35 So.3d 162, 163 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).  
103  Burnette v. State, 901 So. 2d 925, 927 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).  
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The Circuits have recognized that Florida’s reversal of the mens rea 
presumption in Fla. Stat. § 893.101 clashes with the federal offense of sale of a 
controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. § 941(a).104 These outcomes are clearly correct, as 
the Supreme Court in McFadden unanimously held that the federal offense does 
have a mens rea element requiring that defendants either knew the identity of the 
drug involved or knew that the substance they possessed (perhaps with the exact 
identity unknown) was listed on the federal schedules of controlled substances and 
their analogues.105  
Because the current Florida scheme clashes with both the federal scheme and 
the schemes of the 49 other states, the implications of this divergence have been and 
continue to be explored through various litigation. The Eleventh Circuit has 
addressed two of those questions thus far. First, the court held that the terms “serious 
drug offense[s]” and “controlled substance offenses” under the Armed Career 
Criminal Act (“ACCA”) sentencing provision at 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A) do not 
include a mens rea element:  
 
No element of mens rea with respect to the illicit nature of the controlled 
substance is expressed or implied by either definition. We look to the plain 
language of the definitions to determine their elements, and we presume 
that Congress and the Sentencing Commission “said what [they] meant 
and meant what [they] said.”106  
 
In other words, the Eleventh Circuit believed that, to impose a mens rea 
requirement, Congress would have had to affirmatively say so, which is the complete 
opposite of six decades (at least) of Supreme Court precedent. Thus, the Circuit 
found Florida convictions constituted predicate offenses for federal sentencing 
purposes, notwithstanding the Fla. Stat. § 893.101 elimination of the traditional 
mens rea requirement that contributed to those convictions. In so holding, the 
Eleventh Circuit failed to apply (or at least distinguish) the Supreme Court’s 
precedent requiring the opposite, as the Court has “repeatedly held that ‘mere 
omission from a criminal enactment of any mention of criminal intent’ should not 
be read ‘as dispensing with it.’”107  
 
104  See Donawa, at 1281 (11th Cir. 2013) (“it is clear that the ‘least of the acts criminalized’ by 
Fla. Stat. § 893.13(1)(a)(2) does not necessarily violate 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)”.). Shortly thereafter, the 
Fifth Circuit followed suit in Sarmientos v. Holder, 742 F.3d 624, 630–31 (5th Cir. 2014).  
105  See McFadden v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2298 (2015); cf. Miller, 35 So.3d at 163; Burnette, 
901 So. 2d at 927. In McFadden, Chief Justice Roberts issued a separate opinion suggesting the federal 
offense requires an even higher standard, that “a defendant needs to know more than the identity of the 
substance; he needs to know that the substance is controlled.” See McFadden, 135 S. Ct. at 2307 
(Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  
106  See Smith, 775 F.3d at 1267.  
107  See, e.g., Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2009 (quoting Morissette, 342 U.S. at 
250).  
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Next, the Eleventh Circuit held that 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B)’s term “illicit 
trafficking in a controlled substance,” as added to the Immigration and Nationality 
Act in 1990, also does not require an element of mens rea to trigger immigration 
aggravated felony treatment, accepting the argument that: 
 
[T]here was no reason to believe that Congress intended to impose a 
specific mens rea requirement, and thereby exclude state drug-trafficking 
crimes from the aggravated-felony definition solely because they did not 
require knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance involved.108  
 
In a seemingly assailable opinion,109 the Circuit deferred to an agency interpretation 
of the federal statute, rather than defining the statutory term itself, ostensibly per 
“principles of deference articulated in Chevron.”  
Neither Smith nor Choizilme offered any further analysis of the statute or any 
canvassing of the national norms at the time of the enactment of the relevant statute. 
Of course, in 1986 and in 1990 (the relevant dates for those inquiries), precisely zero 
(0) jurisdictions—federal or state—reversed the presumption of criminal mens rea 
in drug sale offenses, so Congress could not have imagined a world in which its 
laws—and heavy sanctions—would be applied to conduct criminalized with no 
mens rea element. It is counter-intuitive to consider that Congress would (or even 
could) implicitly take the drastic step to eliminate culpable mens rea for predicate 
convictions when creating the sentencing enhancement for prior “serious drug 
offenses” in the ACCA or “illicit trafficking offenses” in the INA. As explored, 
infra, this would be counter to decades of Supreme Court precedent.  
A culpable mind is so central to Anglo-American jurisprudence that the Court 
has consistently found that mens rea requirements must be read into (and not 
implicitly read out of) statutes that are otherwise silent regarding scienter.110 The 
 
108  Choizilme, 886 F.3d at 1024.  
109  In Choizilme, the absence of a Florida mens rea requirement should have led to a holding in 
favor of the petitioner, at Chevron “step one.” The Court has recently directed that Chevron does not 
invite agency interpretation at every turn, noting that “the type of reflexive deference exhibited in 
some . . . cases is troubling.” Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120 (2018) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). The Court has indicated it will not defer to an agency, per Chevron, where “the statute, 
read in context, unambiguously forecloses the [agency’s] interpretation.” Esquivel-Quintana, 137 S.Ct. 
at 1572 (noting that although a term may not be defined in a specific statutory section, the BIA and the 
courts should use prevailing definitions of terms to determine what Congress meant, at the time of 
passing the legislation). In 2016, then-Circuit Judge Gorsuch further explained that proper checks and 
balances are compromised where courts do not determine the meaning of statutory language, but 
instead defer to agency interpretation: 
The problem remains that courts are not fulfilling their duty to interpret the law and declare 
invalid agency actions inconsistent with those interpretations in the cases and controversies 
that come before them [ . . . ] [made] by an avowedly politicized administrative agent 
seeking to pursue whatever policy whim may rule the day. 
Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1153 (Gorsuch, concurring).  
110  See, e.g., Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568, 575 (2008) (citing Staples, 511 U.S. at 606, 
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Court has further instructed that courts must ordinarily read each phrase in a federal 
statute enumerating elements of a crime as if the word “knowingly” applied to each 
element.111  
The Court has further consistently crafted implicit mens rea requirements in a 
wide variety of federal criminal and civil112 statutes, including firearms offenses,113 
fraud crimes,114 and interstate threats via the internet.115 It was in the latter context 
that Chief Justice Roberts reiterated “the basic principle that ‘wrongdoing must be 
conscious to be criminal,’ and that a defendant must be ‘blameworthy in mind’ 
before he can be found guilty” and that the Court “interprets criminal statutes to 
include broadly applicable scienter requirements, even where the statute by its terms 
does not contain them.”116 Of course, in 2015, a unanimous Supreme Court decided 
McFadden, noting that where the federal drug delivery statute was facially 
ambiguous a mens rea requirement implicitly required, so the defendant must be 
proven to know either the identity or the illicit nature of the substance to satisfy the 
federal offense.  
 
for the principle that “[s]ome indication of congressional intent, express or implied, is required to 
dispense with mens rea as an element of a crime.”).  
111  See Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 652 (2009) (citing United States v. X-
Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 79 (1994) (Stevens, J., concurring) (applying same in context of 
transmission of sexually illicit materials), and referencing Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 
(1985) (applying the “intent must adhere to each element” concept to food stamp fraud)). Flores-
Figueroa is particularly instructive because the statute at issue required an element of intentional 
possession of a false document, but not an element of knowledge that the identification was real (or 
that it related to a real person), which is dispositive in the criminality of the action. Flores-Figueroa, 
556 U.S. at 656–57. This is directly analogous to the Fla. Stat. § 893.101 scheme at issue in Shular, 
where a defendant is proven to knowingly have something, but is never proven culpable of knowing 
the identity or illicit nature of that something. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 893.13(1)(a)(1); cf. Fla. Stat. § 
893.101 (1-3). 
112  See, e.g., Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 764-66 (2011) (imputing a 
“willful blindness” requirement into an element of a patent infringement statute that was silent on mens 
rea).  
113  Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65 (2014) (imputing a mens rea requirement of 
knowing that a conspirator would have a gun, in order to be convicted of aiding and abetting a firearm 
offense).  
114  Loughrin v. United States, 573 U.S. 351 (2014) (imputing an intent—specifically, the  
purpose to defraud a bank—to a fraudulent check scheme facially ambiguous on whether the ultimate 
victim is intentionally a financial institution), but only imputing a lesser-than-full mens rea requirement 
because the statute elsewhere contained a traditional element establishing that the defendant was 
willfully culpable of reprehensible criminal activity); see also id., at 371 (Alito, J., concurring in part 
and in the judgment) (critically noting that this aspect of the holding was dicta and that the higher mens 
rea of “willfulness” should be imputed to all facially ambiguous elements in future cases).  
115  Elonis v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2001 (2015).  
116  Id.  
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This brings us to the dilemma in Shular and its implications for immigration 
cases. Mr. Shular is serving a federal sentence, enhanced by 15 years, based on his 
Florida convictions, which in turn did not require a culpable mind. Similarly, Mr. 
Choizilme and other immigrants convicted in Florida are subject to removal as 
“aggravated felons” barred from discretionary relief. In every other context, the 
Supreme Court would hold that the categorical approach requires identifying a 
generic standard for the relevant terms, and that that standard is determined by 
canvassing state norms at the time of congressional usage of the terms “serious drug 
offense” (ACCA) and “illicit trafficking” (INA), as measured by their respective 
years. Of course, when Congress used those terms, it could not have considered that 
a state—Florida, in 2002—would later explicitly remove a mens rea requirement. 
Perhaps this does not matter; Congress uses terms as it knows them, and also 
anticipates that the Supreme Court imputes a mens rea wherever it is absent.  
Again, Shular presented, an excellent vehicle for this question—of whether 
national canvassing is necessary to determine if mens rea is an element of the generic 
offense of “serious drug crime”—because Mr. Shular’s lengthy prison sentence 
implicated a very compelling liberty interest.117 The one weakness to Mr. Shular’s 
argument is that his statute has a phrase “involving” various actus rea options, and 
the term softens the literalism of the subsequent phrases.118 As the Solicitor General 
argued, “The contrast between that text and Section 924(e)(2)(A)(ii)’s “involving” 
language indicates that Congress did not intend courts to apply the same generic-
analogue analysis.” In the Solicitor General’s view, “an offense under State law, 
involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or 
distribute, a controlled substance” does not require direct comparison to a generic 
offense.119  
 
117  See Shular, at 782-783 (explaining his prior convictions could dramatically change his 
sentence, as a felon possessing a firearm, from a ten-year maximum to a fifteen-year minimum term of 
imprisonment.) 
118  18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(Q)(i)(ii) As used in this subsection— 
(A) the term “serious drug offense” means— 
(i) an offense under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), the 
Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.), or chapter 705 
of title 46 for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is 
prescribed by law; or 
(ii) an offense under State law, involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with 
intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance (as defined in section 102 
of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)), for which a maximum term of 
imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law.  
119  Transcript of Oral Argument, Shular v. United States, 140 S.Ct. 779 (2020) (No. 18-662) at 
57, https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2019/18-6662_k536.pdf: 
JUSTICE GORSUCH:  
I wonder whether you’ll also keep in mind this—this question about involves, you know, 
the use and carry provision of 924 has kept courts awfully busy, right, what is a “use”? Are 
we going to, you know, what is our assurance we're not going to have similar amounts of 
concern and litigation about what's an “involving?” 
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Significantly, the Solicitor General took the firm position that but for the 
“involving” language, such canvassing would be required. The transcript reflects the 
Court’s concern that interpreting the meaning of “involving” sale would be more 
onerous that determine generic of offense.120 Justice Kavanaugh gets the Solicitor 
General to concede that, in the absence of the word “involve,” the Court would “read 
in” a mens rea requirement.121  
This is exactly what has now happened. On February 26, 2020, the Court 
unanimously ruled against Shular, in an opinion that turned on the idea that “serious 
drug offense” is description of types of qualifying conduct, not a fixed term of art 
with a generic definition, and thus escaped requiring the strict application of the 
categorical approach, i.e. the analysis that would have spared Shular the sentence 
enhancement.  
However, the Court also recognized the using “involving” rather than “is” was 
dispositive. The term “is” would have locked down the term drug offense as a 
generic term of art.122 The Court explicitly said this. The upside here is that by ruling 
against Shular, the court has clarified that the sole reason (not to canvass the states 
for the generic meaning of controlled substance offenses for mens rea requirements) 
was the presence of the diluting word, “involving.”  
Significantly, in order to win the case in front of it, the Solicitor General had to 
concede this point—that the absence of the term “involving” would lead to the 
opposite approach, as the term “drug offense” would then be a generic crime. This 
dictates that the opposite outcome is required in the immigration context and now 
requires reversal of Choizilme and Matter of L-G-H-. The immigration term “illicit 
trafficking in a controlled substance lacks diluting language, i.e. has the equivalent 
of the term “is” in front of the term “illicit trafficking.”123 Words matter.  
 
 
120  See id. 
121  See id. at 36-37: 
JUSTICE KAVANAUGH:  
If we—if we had a federal statute, not a recidivist statute, but a straight up federal statute 
that said it's unlawful to manufacture, distribute or possess with intent to manufacture, 
distribute a controlled substance, it is 100 percent, or close to it, that we would require 
mens rea and knowledge of the substance. Don’t you agree with that?  
MR. BOND [Jonathan C. Bond, Assistant to the Solicitor General]:  
So, we agree that ordinarily you would read in a—you would presume a mens rea 
requirement. Exactly how that would apply across the different elements— 
JUSTICE KAVANAUGH:  
So, you—so if you agree, if this were a straight up federal statute, that mens rea would be 
read in, why not read it in to a recidivist statute?  
122  Shular, 140 S.Ct. at 786 (2020) (“Using ‘involving’ rather than ‘is’ does not clarify that the 
terms are names of offenses; quite the opposite.”).  
123  See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B).  




The foregoing exploration is to both document the Department of Justice’s 
positions interpreting the Immigration and Nationality Act, and whether it ultimately 
gives consistent and credible interpretation to the Controlled Substances Act. As the 
conference revealed, it would be more productive for a broad coalition of fields to 
be tasked with revisiting the origins of the CSA, recognize the long-term 
shortcomings of a philosophy of modern total prohibition, and then reimagine a 
more holistic, less punitive, and more realistic (and less costly, in forms of “cost”) 
approach to regulation. However, despite some sentencing reform and steps toward 
legalization, society is not there, not quite yet. 
Until then, mitigating the harsh consequences of our drug scheme will continue 
to take place in the courts. And in this endeavor, Congress’ words, and those of state 
legislatures, should have value. They should be read consistently to give a principled 
application of those words to each and every criminal defendant and immigrant. 
When Congress repeatedly invokes the drug definitions “as defined at 21 U.S.C. § 
802” throughout the INA, that choice must be applied literally. When states choose 
to deviate from uniform or federal definitions, that is an exercise of legislative will, 
and it must be recognized as such, INA and ACCA consequences be damned. It is 
not credible for the courts to read the CSA definitions out of the statute. Similarly, 
it is not credible to torture the reading of “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance” 
to eliminate a mens rea element, when doing so is contrary to the last decades of 
consistent Supreme Court opinions.  
As remarked, immigrants have largely won all questions regarding drugs and 
deportability, once those questions have reached the Supreme Court. As Martin 
Luther King invoked, “the arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward 
justice.”124 That curve continues, in an ever-narrowing series of questions regarding 
immigrants and controlled substances. One gets the distinct impression that if the 
intellectually honest position prevailed—rather than an outcome-determinative 
reading—we would have a more consistently principled, predictable, and uniform 
intersection of the CSA and the Immigration and Nationality Act. 
 
124  The quote was memorialized in a rug in the Oval Office during the Barack Obama 
presidency, but the succinct and artful language of Dr. King is a reworking of a quote of 19th century 
minister Theodore Parker. See e.g. Theodore Parker And The 'Moral Universe’, National Public Radio, 
(Sept. 2, 2010, 3:00 PM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId= 129609461. 
